A Simple Solution
While working to develop a proposal that would arrest the accelerating naval arms race between the United States, Britain, and Japan, Secretary of State and head of the American delegation Charles Evans Hughes came to a pragmatic realization, concluding that basing the negotiations on arguments of potential national need would allow any party to justify increasing rather than limiting their navy, which would have resulted in the conference accomplishing virtually nothing [1]. To avoid this, Hughes based his proposal on the principle of existing strength, developing a plan that would put an end to all naval construction by the three powers, maintain the relative standing of their navies, and limit the maximum displacement any given capital ship could have [2]. To maintain this standing, Hughes had Navy officials prepare a list of British and Japanese vessels that, if scrapped, would be proportional to the United States halting its extensive naval construction program. While developing this proposal was somewhat complicated and required Hughes to consult with naval experts to determine how to measure "existing naval strength" and how to best maintain the extant relative distribution of that strength [3], what came to be known as Hughes' "stop now" proposal [4] was, at its roots, quite straightforward: in order to stop the naval arms competition, the naval powers would simply have to agree to stop competing. The efficacy of this simple solution to a complex international problem was reflected in the Five-Power Treaty it would eventually bore.
A Bipartisan Delegation for a Wary America
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1. Charles Evans Hughes, David Joseph Danelski, ed. and Joseph S. Tulchin, ed. The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 243. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4903518.
2. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, vol. 2, (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 461. Accessed through HeinOnline, https://bit.ly/383x1Gm.
3. Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence; a Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 273. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015010853698.
4. Pusey, 461.
5. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 450-52.
6. Herring, 453.
7. Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, 244.
8. Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, 247.
1. Charles Evans Hughes, David Joseph Danelski, ed. and Joseph S. Tulchin, ed. The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 243. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4903518.
2. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, vol. 2, (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 461. Accessed through HeinOnline, https://bit.ly/383x1Gm.
3. Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence; a Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 273. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015010853698.
4. Pusey, 461.
5. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 450-52.
6. Herring, 453.
7. Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, 244.
8. Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, 247.