Hughes' "Bombshell" Speech
On the opening day of the conference, Hughes made a bold move, taking to the stage after President Harding's opening speech and laying out the American proposal in detail, even going so far as to list a total of 66 specific ships each country would be required to scrap under the treaty [1]. This break with diplomatic tradition, in which representatives typically outlined and negotiated on proposals behind closed doors, produced spectacular results. Domestically, the New York Times reported that Hughes’ plan had been “praised in the pulpits” and that one pastor had even gone so far as to say the “proposal meant that the nations are now putting aside all thought of war" [2]. Abroad, the Times also reported that the British had been “swept off their feet” by Hughes’ proposal and that despite previous apprehension, Hughes’ “bold approach straight through disarmament was enthusiastically acclaimed” [3]. The proposal was met with “keen satisfaction and admiration” by newspapers in Japan and described as “spectacularly clever” in Italy [4]. This was certainly the effect Hughes had hoped for. No doubt recognizing that pessimism surrounded the conference after a pair of arms reductions conferences held at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 produced little more than platitudes “expressing the desirability of reducing the burden of armaments” with no real commitments to doing so [5], Hughes in his opening speech declared that “the time has passed for mere resolutions that the responsible Powers should examine the question of limitation of armament… The essential facts are sufficiently known. The time has come, and this Conference has been called, not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action” [6]. Hughes understood that the success of the conference hinged on public opinion, at one point informing United States Ambassador to Great Britain George Harvey that it was “vitally important to satisfactory settlement of large issues involved and to [the] success of [the] conference that [the] conference… be closely in touch with American opinion" [7]. In recognizing the importance of public opinion and acting to convert the prevailing apprehension to fervent enthusiasm and acclaim the world over, Hughes not only demonstrated astute political ability, but rendered the overall success of the conference possible and the adoption of his proposals all but certain.
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Products of the Conference
The conference found success in many of its goals, resulting in a Four-Power Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France which replaced the contentious Anglo-Japanese treaty and bound the nations to “respect each other’s possessions in the Pacific and consult in case of conflict among themselves or external threat" [8], a Five-Power Treaty which fixed the existing ratio of capital ship tonnage between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and France, declared a 10-year naval holiday, and bound the United States, Great Britain, and Japan to avoid further fortifying or establishing bases on their possessions in the Pacific (with some exceptions, such as Hawaii), and a Nine-Power Treaty that essentially sought to maintain the Open Door Policy and prevent further Japanese imperialism in China [9].
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Troubled Waters
Despite the overwhelming support Hughes' proposal experienced at the beginning of the conference and the eventual adoption of several treaties which included many of his suggestions, the landmark Five-Power Treaty required patience and time to negotiate. On multiple occasions, delegates from other countries advocated for proposals that would be untenable, either delegitimizing the treaty or making its ratification all but impossible. Each time one of these contentious issues reared its head, Hughes relied on practical and straightforward solutions: when the French pushed for the right to build an exorbitant allotment of auxiliary ships that was far beyond even their prewar strength, Hughes simply limited the treaty to the ratio of capital ship tonnage each power would have and inserted restrictions on the size and permitted armaments of auxiliary craft, rather than compromise the integrity of the treaty [10]. When the Japanese pushed for a higher allotment of capital ship tonnage, insisted that the massive battleship Mutsu not be scrapped (despite Hughes had marking it for destruction on the first day of the conference) [11] , and suggested that the treaty prohibit further fortification of each nation’s possessions in the Pacific, Hughes compromised, agreeing to maintain the status quo of Pacific fortifications with some exceptions and letting the Japanese keep the Mutsu, but reworking the American and British tonnage allotments to maintain the original ratio [12]. In deftly navigating these troubled waters, Hughes demonstrated that the logical nature and straightforward solutions he brought to the table were paramount to the successful negotiation of the Five-Power Treaty.
A photograph of the Japanese battleship Mutsu, taken around 1922. The Mutsu was a source of national pride for the Japanese: some of the funding for it had even come from Japanese schoolchildren, leading the Japanese delegation to insist on retaining it [13]. Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress.
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1. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 454.
2. "HUGHES ARMS PLAN PRAISED IN PULPITS: CANNOT BE REJECTED, AND WHOLE WORLD SUPPORTS IT, SAYS BISHOP MANNING. SHIPMAN HIGHLY PLEASED WOULD "THANK GOD" FOR MOVE-- WORLD HOPES FOR CONFERENCE SUCCESS, SAYS SILVERMAN. DEFINITE PROPOSALS MADE. SHIPMAN PRAISES HUGHES. ASKS PRAYERS FOR CONFERENCE." New York Times (New York, NY), Nov 14, 1921. Accessed through ProQuest, https://bit.ly/3oQEMoP.
3. Charles H. Grasty, “BRITISH PEOPLE ACCLAIM HUGHES: SWEPT OFF THEIR FEET BY HIS DRAMATIC OPENING OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. JOY RECALLS ARMISTICE PREDICTION THAT THE NATION, IF SEA POWER IS ASSURED, WILL GO LIMIT WITH AMERICA." New York Times (New York, NY), Nov 15, 1921. Accessed through ProQuest, https://bit.ly/386y8VB.
4. Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence; a Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 271. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015010853698.
5. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, vol. 2, (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 466. Accessed through HeinOnline, https://bit.ly/383x1Gm.
6. Charles Evans Hughes, The Pathway of Peace; Representative Addresses Delivered During His Term as Secretary of State (1921-1925) (New York, NY and London: Harper & Brothers, 1925), 25. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b61905.
7. Office of the Historian, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Harvey),” in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, Volume 1. United States Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1921v01/d41
8. Herring, 454.
9. Herring, 455; Pusey, 501-02.
10. Pusey, 482-85.
11. Hughes, Representative Addresses, 29.
12. Pusey, 476-79.
13. Herring, 454-55.
1. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 454.
2. "HUGHES ARMS PLAN PRAISED IN PULPITS: CANNOT BE REJECTED, AND WHOLE WORLD SUPPORTS IT, SAYS BISHOP MANNING. SHIPMAN HIGHLY PLEASED WOULD "THANK GOD" FOR MOVE-- WORLD HOPES FOR CONFERENCE SUCCESS, SAYS SILVERMAN. DEFINITE PROPOSALS MADE. SHIPMAN PRAISES HUGHES. ASKS PRAYERS FOR CONFERENCE." New York Times (New York, NY), Nov 14, 1921. Accessed through ProQuest, https://bit.ly/3oQEMoP.
3. Charles H. Grasty, “BRITISH PEOPLE ACCLAIM HUGHES: SWEPT OFF THEIR FEET BY HIS DRAMATIC OPENING OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. JOY RECALLS ARMISTICE PREDICTION THAT THE NATION, IF SEA POWER IS ASSURED, WILL GO LIMIT WITH AMERICA." New York Times (New York, NY), Nov 15, 1921. Accessed through ProQuest, https://bit.ly/386y8VB.
4. Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence; a Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 271. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015010853698.
5. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, vol. 2, (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 466. Accessed through HeinOnline, https://bit.ly/383x1Gm.
6. Charles Evans Hughes, The Pathway of Peace; Representative Addresses Delivered During His Term as Secretary of State (1921-1925) (New York, NY and London: Harper & Brothers, 1925), 25. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b61905.
7. Office of the Historian, “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Harvey),” in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, Volume 1. United States Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1921v01/d41
8. Herring, 454.
9. Herring, 455; Pusey, 501-02.
10. Pusey, 482-85.
11. Hughes, Representative Addresses, 29.
12. Pusey, 476-79.
13. Herring, 454-55.