A Monumental Accomplishment
While each of the treaties that arose from the Washington Naval Conference held significance, none was as unique or monumental as the Five-Power Treaty. Although imperfect (the lack of restrictions on auxiliary ship fleets led to substantial increases in “small ship navies” in the years after the treaty [1] and the lack of enforcement mechanisms drew criticism after the Second World War [2]), the Five-Power Treaty was a landmark experiment in multilateral arms reduction and even served as a template for later agreements that would address its failure to limit auxiliary craft [3]. The adoption of the Five-Power Treaty marked "the first time in recorded history [that] the Great Powers voluntarily surrendered their freedom to arm as they pleased" [4] and has even been compared to the Cold War-era SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union [5]. Despite its shortcomings, the Five-Power Treaty accomplished its goals without sacrificing any major United States interests [6], ultimately averting the massive expenditures associated with a naval arms race that conceivably could have sparked a war between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Both the Five-Power Treaty and the Washington Naval Conference were indicative of growing United States leadership on the global stage. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes played the preeminent role in the orchestration and success of each, masterfully applying his sharp political intellect and pragmatic sensibility to assure their success. Although now relatively obscure, the Washington Naval Conference which Hughes presided over was one of the earliest and most notable examples of United States global leadership in what came to be known as the American Century, and as a result, both the conference and its architect have been deservedly enshrined in American diplomatic history.
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1. Claire Price, “‘SMALL SHIP’ NAVIES GROWING RAPIDLY: ONE EFFECT OF FAILURE OF ARMS TREATY TO RESTRICT AUXILARY CRAFT.” New York Times (New York, NY), Feb 15, 1925. Accessed through ProQuest, https://bit.ly/34PIsiI.
2. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 455.
3. Charles Evans Hughes, David Joseph Danelski, ed. and Joseph S. Tulchin, ed. The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 248. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4903518; Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence; a Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 277. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015010853698.
4. Warren I. Cohen, Empire Without Tears: America’s Foreign Relations, 1921-1933, 1st ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988), 52. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015012150341. Also quoted in Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 454.
5. Robert K. Massie, "The 1921 Salt Talks - And You Are There," New York Times Magazine (New York, NY), October 2, 1977. Accessed via the New York Times Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/02/archives/the-1921-salt-talksand-you-are-there-disarmament.html.
6. In Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, 244-46, Hughes even argues that the treaty actually improved both the contemporary and likely the future standing of the United States Navy relative to those of Britain and Japan.
1. Claire Price, “‘SMALL SHIP’ NAVIES GROWING RAPIDLY: ONE EFFECT OF FAILURE OF ARMS TREATY TO RESTRICT AUXILARY CRAFT.” New York Times (New York, NY), Feb 15, 1925. Accessed through ProQuest, https://bit.ly/34PIsiI.
2. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 455.
3. Charles Evans Hughes, David Joseph Danelski, ed. and Joseph S. Tulchin, ed. The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 248. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4903518; Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence; a Study in American Diplomacy (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 277. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015010853698.
4. Warren I. Cohen, Empire Without Tears: America’s Foreign Relations, 1921-1933, 1st ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988), 52. Accessed through HathiTrust Digital Library, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015012150341. Also quoted in Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 454.
5. Robert K. Massie, "The 1921 Salt Talks - And You Are There," New York Times Magazine (New York, NY), October 2, 1977. Accessed via the New York Times Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/02/archives/the-1921-salt-talksand-you-are-there-disarmament.html.
6. In Hughes, Autobiographical Notes, 244-46, Hughes even argues that the treaty actually improved both the contemporary and likely the future standing of the United States Navy relative to those of Britain and Japan.